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Abstract
High unemployment and fi scal austerity during the Great Recession have led to signifi cant 
migration outfl ows in those European countries that suffered a deep deterioration of 
their economy, Greece being the most obvious case. This paper introduces endogenous 
migration in a small open economy DSGE model to analyze the business cycle effects from 
the interaction of fi scal consolidation instruments with migration. A tax-based consolidation 
induces the strongest increase in emigration, leading to the highest costs in terms of 
aggregate GDP and unemployment in the medium run. As a result, the unemployment 
gains from migration are only temporary. However, in terms of per capita GDP, cuts in the 
components of public spending that are either productive or utility-enhancing can lead to a 
deeper contraction than tax hikes or wasteful spending cuts. The introduction of potential 
migration by the employed implies even higher unemployment costs, a deeper demand 
contraction, and an increase in both the tax hike and the time required to achieve the same 
size of fi scal consolidation.
Keywords: fi scal consolidation, migration, matching frictions, on-the-job search.
JEL classifi cation: E32, F41.
Resumen
La elevada tasa de paro y la austeridad fi scal durante la Gran Recesión han provocado 
importantes movimientos migratorios procedentes de los países europeos que sufrieron un 
profundo deterioro de su economía, siendo Grecia el caso más obvio. En este trabajo se 
introduce una decisión endógena sobre migración en un modelo DSGE aplicado a una economía 
abierta pequeña para así poder analizar los efectos sobre el ciclo económico que surgen de 
la interacción entre los instrumentos de consolidación fi scal y la migración. Una consolidación 
basada en impuestos sobre el trabajo genera los mayores aumentos en la emigración, lo que 
conlleva costes más altos en términos de PIB agregado y desempleo en el medio plazo. Así 
pues, las ganancias en términos de desempleo ocasionadas por la existencia de migración son 
solo temporales. Sin embargo, en términos del PIB per cápita, recortes en los componentes 
del gasto público, ya sea éstos productivos o que proporcionen utilidad directamente, pueden 
provocar una contracción más profunda que los aumentos de impuestos o los recortes 
en el gasto público no productivo o que no genere utilidad. La introducción de la posibilidad de 
migración por parte de los individuos empleados genera costes asociados al desempleo aún 
más altos, una mayor contracción de la demanda y un aumento tanto de los impuestos como 
del tiempo requerido para lograr el mismo volumen de consolidación fi scal.
Palabras clave: consolidación fi scal, migración, fricciones de emparejamiento en el mercado 
laboral, búsqueda de trabajo por parte de los individuos empleados.
Códigos JEL: E32, F41.
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1Prior to the crisis, immigration from new member states of the EU or from outside the block contributed
to migration surpluses in peripheral countries.
2In 2014, the unemployment rate in Greece rose to 28%, more than triple that of 2008, with a profound
impact on the mobility decisions of the Greek people, previously considered among the least favorable Euro-
peans towards long distance mobility (Commission (2006)). The total estimate of 612,400 emigrants in Figure
2 refers to all age groups, emigrants according to data from the Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT).
Beyer and Smets (2015) have found a gradual convergence in labour mobility between Europe and the US,
reflecting both a fall in interstate migration in the US and a rise in the role of migration in Europe.
3This figure is comparable to the average annual immigrant flow of 485,000 persons in Spain during the
immigration boom of 2000-2006 (Bentolila et al. (2008)). The recent emigration wave involves high mobility
of foreign nationals: in 2012 approximately 5% of foreign residents in Spain left the country. However,
since 2007 there is also net emigration of Spaniards born in Spain with outflows tripling between 2006-2012
(Izquierdo et al. (2016)). Data for 2012 in the same study reveal that 39.2% of those outflows were directed
to other EU countries and 30.8% to South America. In the case of Greece, Germany and the UK concentrate
together more than half of the post 2010 emigration. The US and Australia seem to be the next most popular
destinations, followed by several other European destinations (Labrianidis and Pratsinakis (2016)).
1 Introduction
Worsening labour market conditions and fiscal tightness in the aftermath of the recent crisis
have led to increased migration outflows from peripheral countries of Europe (see Figure 1).
The surge in unemployment rates and the lack of work opportunities, together with fiscal
austerity involving tax hikes, cuts in social benefits and restrictions in new recruitment of
public employees, have contributed to this notable increase in migration flows.1 For instance,
Greece and Spain exhibited net migration outflows in 2013, representing 2.2% and 1.9% of
the workforce, respectively (Lazaretou (2016)). Over the period 2010-2015, 533,000 Greek
residents of working age (15-64) left the country in search of employment, better pay and
better social and economic prospects (see also Figure 2).2 In the case of Spain, migration
outflows went from an average of 0.4% of the population over the period 2008-2010 to 1.2% in
2012 (Izquierdo et al. (2016)). Since 2010, outflows have totaled more than 400,000 persons
per year, which is, both in absolute and relative terms, the highest level of emigration in
Spanish history.3 The goal of this paper is twofold. First, we study the macroeconomic
consequences of migration and the implications for business cycle fluctuations in the country
of departure. Second, we shed light on the interaction between fiscal consolidation and
endogenous migration decisions.
Although mobility in response to disparate labour market conditions might result in im-
provements in aggregate employment, the impact on local adjustments hinges on a number
of factors. First, as migrants flow abroad, labour market tightness increases in the home
country, putting upward pressure on wages and hampering firms’ marginal costs. Addition-
ally, and insofar as employed workers also choose to emigrate, firms not only find it more
costly to hire new workers but also face a shortage of labour. For instance, Labrianidis and
Pratsinakis (2016) report that half of those leaving Greece after 2010 were employed at the
Nearly half a million Greeks have become economic migrants since the crisis began,
one of the biggest exoduses from any eurozone country. And they are still leaving.
(New York Times, June 5, 2018: Greece May Be Turning a Corner. Greeks Who Fled
Are Staying Put.)
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time of emigration.4 Second, migrants take with them not only their labour supply, but
also their purchasing power, inducing a higher fall in internal demand during bad times.
Although this impact can be mitigated if emigrants send some of their earnings back home,
remittances inflows in the periphery have not increased at the same rate as emigration and
amount only to a small portion of total GDP.5 On the other hand, the impact on aggregate
demand depends on the degree of openness and the importance of home bias in the demand
for tradable goods. Farhi and Werning (2014) show that emigration can reduce labour supply
to meet a demand shortfall in the non-tradable sector, leaving stayers in an unchanged situ-
ation. Emigration can also lead to an increase in external demand. However, in most typical
cases with lower trade integration, the increase in external demand might not compensate
for the fall in internal demand.
Notably, labour mobility also has fiscal consequences with the emigration of net payers
posing a challenge to the public treasury (Borjas et al. (2018)). Out-migration shifts the tax
base, both by affecting private demand and, to the extent that employed workers decide to
leave, by reducing taxable income. However, migration decisions also depend on migrants’
expectations regarding future socioeconomic conditions and the security of their future in
the home country. In other words, migrants may leave due to the worsening of the domestic
fiscal stance and the perception of future austerity. On the other hand, migration can act as
a fiscal stabilizer, mitigating increases in unemployment and therefore lifting fiscal pressure
off national governments by reducing the payments of unemployment benefits.
This paper assesses the interplay between migration, fiscal consolidation, and the macroe-
conomy in comparison to a counterfactual situation of immobility. To this end, endogenous
migration decisions are introduced in a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DGSE)
model of a small open economy (SOE) with sticky prices and search and matching frictions.
Both the employed and the unemployed have an incentive to migrate abroad where better
wage and employment opportunities exist. The model therefore features cross-border on-the-
job search. Searching for foreign jobs is subject to a pecuniary cost, whereas living abroad
4Several sample surveys investigating the qualitative characteristics of these emigrants have coincided in
that the typical migrant is young, single, highly skilled, and having at least two years of work experience
(see, e.g, Triandafyllidou and Gropas (2014) and Labrianidis and Pratsinakis (2016)).
5Data on remittances over GDP from the World Bank for 2013 are as follows: Ireland: 0.33%, Greece:
0.34%, Spain: 0.75%, and Portugal: 1.95%. The Hellenic Observatory survey on the Greek emigration reveals
that only 19% of migrants send remittances, suggesting that “emigration contributes mainly to the subsistence
and/or the socioeconomic progress of the emigrants themselves and not of the household” (Labrianidis and
Pratsinakis (2016)).
entails a utility cost. Apart from supplying labour, migrants pay taxes, buy the foreign con-
sumption good and send remittances to the country of origin. We calibrate our model for
the Greek economy, which has exhibited significant migration outflows and has experienced
the implementation of a sizeable fiscal consolidation program. It thus seems a natural choice
to discipline our model.6
6Greece emerged in August 2018 from three consecutive bailouts, totalling around €290 billion in loans
from its European partners and the International Monetary Fund, to tackle its debt crisis. This has been the
biggest bailout in global financial history. Austerity measures, such as tax hikes and cuts in public spending,
were a condition of the bailout.
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We first investigate the importance of the migration channel over the business cycle
through the dynamic responses of our model to a negative TFP shock and a risk premium
shock. To this end, we perform a comparison to a benchmark version of the model without
migration. We find that a negative TFP shock or a risk premium shock increases the search
abroad of unemployed job seekers, which has a positive impact on short-run unemployment,
but also reinforces the negative effects of the shock on consumption. Over time, as the
impact of the shock fades out and the job-finding rate returns towards its steady-state level,
we observe some return migration, which leads to higher unemployment costs in the medium
run, relative to the no-migration scenario. The presence of the job search abroad of current
workers in the model, and therefore the potential emigration of the employed, reinforces
the fall in consumption, mitigates the short-run unemployment gains from migration and
reinforces unemployment costs over time. The mitigation of the short-run unemployment
gains is due to the fact that the exodus of current workers with successful matches abroad
leads firms to cut vacancies by less, mitigating therefore the search abroad for unemployed
job seekers, while the reinforcement of the unemployment costs over time comes from the
strongest contraction in consumption and employment.
We then perform a positive analysis of the economic consequences of migration during
fiscal consolidation episodes by examing the effects on output and unemployment. In par-
ticular, we study fiscal consolidations implemented via increases in labour income tax rates
or cuts in public expenditures. For the latter we consider various possible roles, namely
wasteful, utility-enhancing and productive. Fiscal consolidation is modeled as a negative
shock to the debt target, in a fashion similar to Erceg and Linde´ (2013), Pappa et al. (2015)
and Bandeira et al. (2018). Our findings indicate that a tax-based consolidation induces the
highest increase in the emigration of both the unemployed and employed, which implies an
increase in the tax hike required to achieve a given size of debt reduction relative to the
no-migration scenario and exacerbates the induced GDP contraction. As a result, the un-
employment gains from migration for the stayers are only temporary. In the medium run,
labour tax hikes lead to the biggest fall in aggregate GDP and increase in unemployment.
However, in terms of per capita GDP, cuts in the components of public spending that are
either productive or utility-enhancing lead to a much deeper contraction than tax hikes or
wasteful spending cuts. Government spending cuts have a non-monotonic impact on migra-
tion: initially outflows increase due to the negative demand effect, while later this is reversed
due to the positive wealth effect, which decreases household’s labour supply and increases
the wage. Both in the case of tax hikes and spending cuts, the introduction of potential
migration by the employed limits further the short-run unemployment gains from migration
and reinforces the unemployment increase over time. We also perform simulations for the
actual fiscal consolidation mix implemented in Greece over the period 2009-2015 in a macroe-
conomic environment proxied by a negative investment shock and a risk premium shock. We
show that the model is able to match well the size and composition of migration outflows in
Greece over the period under examination.
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The two main results of the paper have important policy implications. First, we show
that labour income tax hikes and government spending cuts lead to different outcomes in
terms of net migration. The choice of the fiscal instrument for debt consolidation therefore
matters if policymakers want to avoid an exodus of workers from the country undergoing fiscal
adjustment. Specifically, a tax-based consolidation increases significantly migration outflows,
while the effect of spending-based consolidation is non-monotonic due to the opposite forces
of the negative demand effect and the positive wealth effect. This then implies that while
tax hikes are the most harmful consolidation instrument in terms of aggregate output, cuts
in the components of public spending that are either productive or utility-enhancing may
be even more detrimental for per capita GDP. Second, we show that unemployment gains
from migration are only temporary following an adverse business-cycle shock or a fiscal
consolidation shock. Moreover, these short-run gains are reversed over time, and even more
so when we consider also the migration of the employed. Even though in the case of business-
cycle shocks and spending consolidation there is some return migration in the medium run,
as mentioned above, in the case of tax-based consolidation the situation is different. The
increase, relative to the migration scenario, in the tax rate required to achieve a given size of
debt reduction leads to a deeper demand contraction, which offsets the unemployment gains
from the reduction in labour supply. Cross-country labour mobility is therefore a weak and
temporary shock absorber in this case, hurting the economy in the long run. This result
delivers a second message for policy makers, namely that if tax hikes are implemented, it is
very important to provide motives so that employed workers do not flee the country.
Our paper adds to the literature on the macroeconomic effects of migration by exploring
the fiscal and business-cycle implications of endogenous labour force outflows in a SOE im-
plementing debt consolidation. We therefore depart from existing studies that examine the
implications of migration for the destination economy using models with labour market fric-
tions in a static framework (see, e.g., Ortega (2000); Liu (2010); Chassamboulli and Palivos
(2014); Chassamboulli and Peri (2015); Liu et al. (2017); Battisti et al. (2018); and Iftikhar
and Zaharieva (2018)) by disentangling the dynamic effects on the country of origin.7 In
the tradition of papers on the impact of immigrants on host labour markets, the stock of
migrants is generally taken as an exogenous variable or immigration is modeled on the basis
of a reduced form approach, whereas in our setup the migration of both the unemployed
and the employed occurs endogenously, which allows us to explore this channel in the face
of shocks and policy actions. A link can also be established with previous studies featuring
on-the-job search in RBC models (see, e.g., Dolado et al. (2009); Krause and Lubik (2006)
and Tu¨zemen (2017)) but without migration. Finally, the paper contributes to the theoret-
7There is very little work so far on migration using macro models with labour market frictions in dynamic
setting (see, e.g., Braun and Weber (2016), Kiguchi and Mountford (2018), and Lozej (2018)). For macroe-
conomic models of migration without labour market frictions, see among others Storesletten (2000), Canova
and Ravn (2000), Mandelman and Zlate (2012), Farhi and Werning (2014), Hauser (2017), and Smith and
Thoenissen (2018). For recent empirical studies, see, e.g., Dustmann and Frattini (2014), Furlanetto and
Robstad (2017), d’Albis et al. (2018).
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ical literature on the effects of fiscal consolidation (see, e.g., Erceg and Linde´ (2012); Erceg
and Linde´ (2013); Pappa et al. (2015); Philippopoulos et al. (2017); Bandeira et al. (2018)),
which has considered an immobile labour force, by studying the interaction between fiscal
consolidation and migration.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our DSGE model and
Section 3 discusses our calibration. Sections 4 and 5 contain our results. Finally, Section 6
concludes the paper.
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2 A Small Open Economy Model with Migration
Our model introduces labour force mobility in a standard SOE model with search and match-
ing frictions, sticky prices, and lack of monetary policy independence. The SOE is labeled
Home. We consider in our calibration a scenario in which higher wages and more employment
opportunities exist abroad than in Home. Hence, when we introduce endogenous migration
decisions in the model, unemployed job seekers from Home will have an incentive to migrate
abroad. Current workers may also have an incentive to migrate given higher wages and better
fiscal conditions abroad. Apart from supplying labour, migrants pay taxes and consume part
of their income abroad.
Home nationals are part of a representative household. In terms of their labour market
status, household members can be employed or unemployed and participate in the domestic
and the foreign labour markets.8 Searching for foreign jobs is subject to a pecuniary cost,
whereas living abroad entails a utility cost (see, e.g., Hauser (2017)). Together with labour
supply decisions (hours), consumption and savings are defined at the household level.9 On
the production side, following standard practice in the literature (see, e.g., Trigari (2006)
and Erceg and Linde´ (2013)), we separate the decisions regarding factor demands from price
setting to simplify the description of the model. There are three types of firms: (i) competitive
firms that use labour and effective capital to produce a non-tradable intermediate good, (ii)
monopolistic retailers that transform the intermediate good into a tradable good, and (iii)
competitive final goods producers that use domestic and foreign produced retail goods to
produce a final, non-tradable good. The latter is used for private and public consumption, as
well as for investment. Price rigidities arise at the retail level, while labour market frictions
occur in the sector producing intermediate goods. The government collects taxes and issues
debt to finance public expenditure, lump-sum transfers, and the provision of unemployment
benefits. Initially, we will treat public spending as a waste. We will then consider additional
roles for public expenditure, namely productive and utility-enhancing spending, in Section
5.4. Implementation of debt consolidation occurs through labour income tax hikes or public
spending cuts.
In what follows below, the asterisk  denotes foreign variables or parameters. We treat
foreign variables as exogenous and therefore omit the time subscript. All quantities in the
model are in aggregate terms, but we also present responses of per capita variables in the
results that follow.
8As discussed in Section 5.5, introducing endogenous labour force participation does not alter substantially
our results. The main impact is that fiscal consolidation leads to a decrease in labour force participation
(positive wealth effect) and therefore in the short-run unemployment rate. Keeping this out of our analysis
allows us to isolate the effect of migration on unemployment.
9See Andolfatto (1996) for an application of the big household assumption in a framework with labour-
market search.
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2.1 Home
2.1.1 Nationals, Residents and Migrants
We assume a continuum of identical households of mass one. In what follows we will refer
to the representative household. The total number of Home nationals of the representative
household is assumed to be constant and equal to n¯. On the contrary, the number of Home
residents varies depending on changes in the stock of Home migrants abroad, with the latter
varying over time either due to new arrivals or due to returns back to Home. Denoting by
Nt the resident population and by ne,t the stock of emigrant workers from Home, total Home
nationals are given by
n¯ = Nt + ne,t . (1)
At any point in time, Home residents are either employed nt or unemployed job seekers ut,
Nt = nt + ut . (2)
Among the unemployed job seekers ut, a share 1 − st are searching in the domestic labour
market, while the remaining st are looking for jobs abroad. Those who seek jobs abroad face
an individual pecuniary cost ς (s˜t), where s˜t is the average share of unemployed looking for
jobs abroad per household and ς ′ (s˜t) > 0.10 This endogenous cost function (see Section 3 for
the specific functional form) helps to smooth out migration decisions in the model, putting
a brake to the search abroad of the unemployed. In the domestic labour market, jobs are
created through a matching function of the following form:
mt = μ1 (υt)
μ2 ((1− st) ut)1−μ2 , (3)
where mt denotes matches, υt denotes vacancies posted by firms, μ1 measures the efficiency
of the matching process and μ2 denotes the elasticity of the matching technology with respect
to vacancies.11 We define the probabilities of a job seeker to be hired ψH,t and of a vacancy
to be filled ψF,t as follows:
ψH,t ≡ mt
(1− st) ut and ψF,t ≡
mt
υt
.
Those currently employed in the domestic labour market nt can exert effort zt in searching
for a job abroad where better labour market and fiscal conditions exist. The higher the
search intensity, the higher the probability to be matched with a job abroad in the next
10Superscript ′ denotes first derivative.
11A natural question is whether migration precedes search or search precedes migration. Given the possi-
bility of search for foreign jobs via the internet, we consider here the case in which the unemployed and the
employed move abroad with a job in hand. However, we can obtain similar results if we assume instead that
(i) unemployed first relocate and then are matched and (ii) there is contemporaneous timing in matching.
For remote search and migration, see also Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl (2017).
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period. We denote by ϕ (zt) the productivity of on-the-job search effort measured in terms of
the probability of finding a job abroad. Searching while employed is subject to a pecuniary
cost φ (zt), measured in units of the final good. We assume that ϕ
′ (zt) > 0 and φ′ (zt) > 0,
with ϕ
′(zt)
ϕ(zt)
< φ
′(zt)
φ(zt)
such that on-the-job search effort is effectively costly (see, e.g., Krause
and Lubik (2006) and Tu¨zemen (2017)). The law of motion of employed workers in Home is
given by
nt+1 = (1− σ − ψHϕ (zt))nt + ψH,t (1− st) ut , (4)
where σ denotes the exogenous separation rate and ψHϕ (zt) accounts for those workers that
move abroad to join the measure of employed migrants.12
The law of motion for emigrant employment ne,t is then given by
ne,t+1 = (1− σ)ne,t + ψH (stut + ϕ (zt)nt) . (5)
where for simplicity we assume that the job finding probability abroad for Home unemployed
and employed is equal.
2.1.2 Households
The representative household consists of a continuum of infinitely lived agents. The house-
hold derives utility from a consumption bundle Ct, composed of goods purchased by Home
residents ct and by emigrants ce,t,
Ct = ct + ce,t , (6)
where ce,t is determined through (9) below.
To keep with the representative household framework, we assume that all agents pool
consumption risk perfectly (for macro-labour models with migration and a representative
agent, see, e.g., Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl (2017), Mandelman and Zlate (2012), Davis
et al. (2014), and Binyamini and Razin (2008)). The household also suffers disutility from
having members working abroad ne,t and from hours worked at home and abroad, ht and he,
respectively. The instantaneous utility function is given by
U (Ct, ht, nt, ne,t) =
(
Ct − ζC˜t
)1−η
1− η − χ
h1+ξt nt + h
1+ξ
e ne,t
1 + ξ
− Ω(ne,t)
1+μ
1 + μ
, (7)
where η is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, ζ is the parameter
determining external habits in aggregate consumption where the consumption reference is
12Focusing on cross-country rather than within-country wage differentials, we abstract from on-the-job
search domestically, which would require modeling market segmentation. We will calibrate the model below
to Greece where the job-to-job transition probability is low, amounting to 5% (Garda (2016), Figure 6A),
and was even lower during the Great Recession (see section 4.3 in Casado et al. (2015)).
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taken as given by the household, with Ct = Ct−1 in equilibrium. The strictly positive
parameters Ω, χ, μ and ξ are associated with the disutility from hours worked and from
living abroad. The disutility from having family members abroad captures notions such
as different culture, food, habits; distance from relatives and friends; less dense networks;
difficulties experienced with bureaucracy and integration, as well as families ties between the
migrant and the non-migrant members of the household.13 Hours worked in Home ht are
determined through negotiation over the joint surplus of workers and firms (see below), while
hours worked abroad he are taken as exogenous.
The budget constraint, in real aggregate terms, is given by
(1 + τ c) ct + it + bg,t + etrf,t−1bf,t−1 + ς (s˜t) stut + φ (zt)nt
≤
(1− τnt )wthtnt +
[
rkt − τ k
(
rkt − δt
)]
xtkt + rt−1bg,t−1 + etbf,t + etΞt + but +Π
p
t + Tt , (8)
where ς (s˜t) stut and φ (zt)nt are the total costs of search for jobs abroad for the unemployed
and the employed, respectively, wt is the hourly wage, r
k
t is the return on effective capital,
b denotes unemployment benefits, et is the real exchange rate, and Π
p
t are profits from mo-
nopolistic retailers. The depreciation rate of capital is δt and the degree of capital utilization
is xt. Lump-sum transfers and tax rates on private consumption, private capital, and labour
income are given by Tt, τ
c, τ k, τnt , respectively. Government bonds are denoted by bg,t, and
pay the return rt, while bf,t denote liabilities with the rest of the world with return rf,t.
14
Migrants’ labour income is spent on purchases of goods abroad ce,t and remittances sent to
Home, denoted by etΞt (in units of the Home final good),
Ξt + (1 + τ
c) ce,t = (1− τn)whene,t . (9)
Following Mandelman and Zlate (2012), we assume a remittances rule of the following form:
Ξt = 
(
(1− τn)w
(1− τnt )wt
)ρΞ
. (10)
The rationale behind (10) is that remittances represent an altruistic compensation mecha-
nism between migrant and domestic workers. In other words, assuming ρΞ > 0, a relative
improvement in the net wage premium abroad leads to an increase in remittances. Purchases
13Including the utility cost of migration, in addition to the pecuniary costs of job search abroad, is useful in
smoothing out migration decisions when we study the case of labour income tax hikes, which is the instrument
that leads to the strongest increase in migration outflows. Without this utility cost, pecuniary costs would
have to be unrealistically high in the simulations we perform in Section 5.5.
14In other words, the household lends to the government and borrows from abroad. Assuming government
debt is only held by domestic households is in line with the empirical pattern for the “repatriation of public
debt” after 2009 in peripheral countries of Europe (See Figure 1 in Brutti and Saure´ (2016)), supported by
the secondary market theory of Broner et al. (2010).
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once remittances are chosen (see also Mandelman and Zlate (2012)).15
The household owns the capital stock, which evolves according to
kt+1 = i,t
[
1− ω
2
(
it
it−1
− 1
)2]
it + (1− δt) kt , (11)
where it is private investment, i,t denotes an investment efficiency shock, which will be
present in our simulations later on (see Section 5.5), and ω dictates the size of investment
adjustment costs. Following Neiss and Pappa (2005), the depreciation rate δt depends on the
degree xt, of capital utilization according to
δt = δ¯x
ι
t , (12)
where δ¯ and ι are positive constants.
Given that he is exogenous, ce,t is determined through (9) and ht is determined through
negotiation over the joint surplus of workers and firms (see below), the problem of the house-
hold is to choose ct, kt+1, it, xt, bg,t, bf,t, nt+1, ne,t+1, st, zt to maximize expected lifetime
utility subject to the budget constraint, the laws of motion of resident and migrant employ-
ment, taking the probability of finding a job in Home and abroad as given, the law of motion
of capital, the definition of capital depreciation, and the composition of the population. We
report the full set of first order conditions in the Online Appendix and focus here on those
that determine job seeking and migration.16 Denoting by λc,t, λn,t and λe,t the Lagrange
multipliers on the budget constraint and on the laws of motion of domestic and migrant
employment, (4) and (5), the first order conditions with respect to nt+1, ne,t+1, st and zt are
given by
λn,t = β
[
λc,t+1 ((1− τnt )wt+1ht+1 − b− φ (zt+1))− χ
h1+ξt+1
1 + ξ
]
+β [λn,t+1 (1− σ − ψH,t+1 − ψHϕ (zt+1)) + λe,t+1ψHϕ (zt+1)] , (13)
of goods abroad ce,t is therefore modelled as the residual of the budget constraint of migrants
15We abstract from endogenizing the allocation of immigrant income between remittances and consumption
of the foreign good, which would require to either assume that the household in Home makes this decision
or to model migrants as separate optimizing agents. Given that remittances have increased much less than
recent migration outflows from Europe’s periphery, as emphasized in the Introduction, endogenizing such
choice is outside the scope of our paper.
16The Online Appendix is available at http://pareto.uab.es/jcaballe/Papers/MigrationOnlineAppendix.pdf.
λe,t = β
[
λc,t+1 ((1− τn) et+1whe − b + ς (s˜t+1))− χ h
1+ξ
e
1 + ξ
− Ω (ne,t+1)μ
]
+β [λe,t+1 (1− σ − ψH)] , (14)
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ψHλe,t − λc,tς (s˜t) = λn,tψH,t , (15)
λc,t
φ′ (zt)
ϕ′ (zt)
= ψH (λe,t − λn,t) . (16)
Equations (13) and (14) determine the evolution of the value of being employed in Home
and abroad, respectively. In both cases, the value for the household of a newly established
match equates to the net direct utility gain, which is equal to the utility value of the net
wage, where the latter is adjusted for the costs of searching abroad, minus the disutility
from supplying hours and, for the case of equation (14), from having members abroad, plus
the continuation value of the match.17 The latter is the expected value of continuing with
the job without experiencing an exogenous separation, net of the value foregone because
workers are not simultaneously job seeking, which is captured in equations (13) and (14) by
ψH,t+1 and ψ

H respectively. Equation (13) also accounts for the fact that with probability
ψHϕ (zt+1) a current worker will quit to take up a job abroad.
18 Equation (15) shows that,
at the margin, the value of job seeking at home and abroad, with the latter including again
the utility-adjusted cost of moving abroad, must be equalized. In other words, household
members will not search for a job in Home when the value of searching abroad is higher, and
vice versa. Finally, condition (16) states that, in equilibrium, the marginal costs of on-the-
job search intensity, in units of consumption, must be equal to the excess value of working
abroad relative to working in Home, subject to the probability of finding a job abroad. The
higher this differential, the higher is the optimal level of on-the-job search.19
2.1.3 Intermediate goods firms
Intermediate goods are produced with a Cobb-Douglas technology,
yt = At (htnt)
1−α (xtkt)
α , (17)
17Note that a new match becomes productive next period.
18The Online Appendix includes the full derivation of equations (13) and (14). It is shown that the value
of being employed in Home or abroad includes the full foregone value of being unemployed, which in turn
consists of the value of the unemployment benefit and the value of being matched to a job.
19In the scenarios we analyze below, we only consider cases where λe > λn is true in the steady state.
where kt and nt are capital and labour inputs, xt is the degree of capital utilization, and At
is an exogenous stationary TFP process.20
Since current hires give future value to intermediate firms, the optimization problem
is dynamic, with firms maximizing the discounted value of future profits. The number of
workers currently employed nt is taken as given and the employment decision concerns the
number of vacancies υt posted in the current period, so as to employ the desired number of
workers nt+1 in the next period. For firms, the law of motion of employment is given by
20Note that without the assumption of variable capital utilization all factors of production would be
predetermined, meaning that output cannot adjust on impact in response to shocks.
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nt+1 = (1− σ − ψHϕ (zt))nt + ψF,tυt ,
which is equivalent to (4). Firms also decide the amount of effective capital xtkt to be rented
from the household at rate rkt . The problem of an intermediate firm with nt workers currently
employed can be written as
Q(nt) = max
xtkt,υt
{
px,tyt − wthtnt − rkt xtkt − κυt + Etβt+1Q(nt+1)
}
,
where px,t is the relative price of intermediate goods with the final good being the numeraire,
κ is the cost of posting a new vacancy, and βt+1 = βλct+1/λct is the household’s subjective
discount factor. The maximization takes place subject to the law of motion of employment,
where the firm takes the probability of the vacancy being filled as given. The first order
conditions with respect to effective capital and vacancies are
rkt = α
px,tyt
xtkt
, (18)
and
κ
ψF,t
= Etβt+1
[
(1− α) px,t+1yt+1
nt+1
− wt+1ht+1 + (1− σ − ψHϕ (zt+1))
κ
ψF,t+1
]
. (19)
According to (18) and (19), the value of the marginal product of capital equals the real
rental rate and the marginal cost of hiring an additional worker is set equal to the expected
marginal benefit. The latter includes the marginal productivity of labour minus the wage
plus the continuation value, knowing that with probability σ the match can be destroyed and
that a termination can also occur due to cross-border job matches captured by ψHϕ (zt+1).
2.1.4 Wage bargaining
Wages are determined by splitting the surplus of a match between the worker and the firm
according to their relative bargaining powers. Denoting by ϑ ∈ (0, 1) the firms’ bargaining
power, the splitting rule is given by (1− ϑ) (1− τnt )SFt = ϑSHt , where SHt denotes the
worker’s surplus from a match in Home and SFt denotes the surplus of the firm. The surplus
for workers consists of the asset value of employment net of the outside option given by the
value of being unemployed. As shown in the Online Appendix, the worker’s surplus from a
match in Home can be written as
SHt = (1− τnt )wtht − b−
χ
λc,t
h1+ξt
1 + ξ
− φ (zt) + ϕ (zt) ς (s˜t)
+ (1− σ − ψH,t − ϕ (zt) (ψH − ψH,t)) Etβt+1SHt+1 .
The introduction of on-the-job search affects the household’s decisions regarding job seeking
and regarding also the allocation of job seekers’ search between Home and abroad through the
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impact on the asset value of being employed in Home. This asset value is negatively affected
by the pecuniary costs of on-the-job search φ (zt) and the higher probability of leaving the
job in the future due to successful on-the-job search effort, as given by the term ϕ (zt), and
positively affected by the fact that, by being employed in Home, the worker avoids incurring
search cost looking for a job abroad when unemployed ς (s¯t).
Using the equation above together with the equivalent expression for the value of an
additional employee abroad SFh,t (see the Online Appendix), the definition of hiring rates,
and the first order condition with respect to st, we obtain
ψH,tEt
(
βt+1S
H
t+1
)
= ψHEt
(
βt+1S
F
h,t+1
)− ς (s˜t) .
This condition shows that, in equilibrium, the expected value of searching in the two labour
markets is equalized (see also equation (15) expressed in units of the consumption good).
This expected value will depend not only on the probability of finding a job in each labour
market, but also on the expected utility from having an additional worker at Home or abroad,
which, in turn, will depend on the respective wage and separation rate.
In turn, the firm’s surplus is given by
SFt = (1− α)
px,tyt
nt
− wtht + (1− σ − ψHϕ (zt))
κ
ψF,t
.
Using the above expressions, the negotiated real wage income wtht, determined by the split-
ting rule of the Nash bargaining, is given by
wtht = (1− ϑ)
{
(1− α) px,tyt
nt
+ (1− ϕ (zt)) ψH,t
ψF,t
κ
}
+
ϑ
(1− τnt )
{
b +
χ
λc,t
h1+ξt
1 + ξ
+ φ (zt)− ϕ (zt) ς (s˜t)
}
. (20)
The first term, weighted by the workers’ bargaining power (1− ϑ) includes the value of the
marginal product of labour and the continuation value of the match to the firm, corrected
by the continuation value of the match to the household. The presence of on-the-job search
abroad affects this term through the possibility that workers can resign from their contracts.
This is captured by (1− ϕ (zt)), which reflects the fact that the higher is on-the-job search,
the lower the average tenure of work contracts in Home, pushing down on wages. The
second term refers to the workers’ surplus and consists of the immediate outside option of
being unemployed, corrected for the disutility from hours. This term is also affected by the
pecuniary cost of on-the-job search φ (zt). Since, when employed, a worker incurs a cost
from on-the-job search, the outside option must include the savings from not incurring this
cost. Finally, the last term ϕ (zt) ς (s˜t) appears because, in equilibrium, the worker surplus in
Home and abroad must be equal taking into consideration the migration costs. The worker’s
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surplus from a match in Home includes an extra term to account for the fact that, by being
employed in Home, the worker avoids incurring search cost looking for a job abroad when
unemployed ς (s˜t). The determination of hours in equilibrium through negotiation over the
joint surplus of workers and firms is presented in the Online Appendix.
2.1.5 Retailers
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive retailers indexed by i on the unit
interval. Retailers buy domestic intermediate goods and differentiate them with a technology
that transforms one unit of intermediate goods into one unit of retail goods, and, thus, the
relative price px,t of intermediate goods coincides with the real marginal cost faced by the
retailers. Let yi,t be the quantity of output produced by retailer i. These goods are aggregated
into a tradable good, which is given by
yr,t =
[∫ 1
0
(yi,t)
−1
 di
] 
−1
.
where  > 1 is the constant elasticity of demand for each variety of retail goods. The
aggregate tradable good is sold at the nominal price Pr,t =
(∫
(Pi,r,t)
−1 di
) 1
−1 , where Pi,r,t is
the price of each variety i. The demand for each intermediate good depends on its relative
price and on aggregate demand:
yi,t =
(
Pi,r,t
Pr,t
)−
yr,t .
We assume that in any given period each retailer can reset its price with a fixed probability
1 − λp. Firms that are able to reset their nominal price choose P ∗i,r,t so as to maximize
expected real profits given by
Πt (i) = Et
∞∑
s=0
(βλp)
s λc,t+s
λc,t
([
Pi,r,t
Pt+s
− px,t+s
]
yi,t+s
)
subject to the respective demand schedule, where Pt is the final good price. Since all firms
are ex-ante identical, P ∗i,r,t = P
∗
r,t for all i. The resulting expression for the real reset price
p∗r,t ≡ P ∗r /Pt is
p∗r,t
pr,t
=

(− 1)
Nt
Dt (21)
with
Nt = px,tyr,t + λpEtβt+1 (πr,t+1)Nt+1 , (22)
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 21 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1839
Dt = pr,tyr,t + λpEtβt+1 (πr,t+1)−1Dt+1 , (23)
where pr,t ≡ Pr,t/Pt and πr,t≡ Pr,t/Pr,t−1 is the producer price inflation. Under the assumption
of Calvo pricing, the price index in nominal terms is given by
(Pr,t)
1− = λp (Pr,t−1)
1− + (1− λp)
(
P ∗r,t
)1−
. (24)
The aggregate tradable good is sold domestically and abroad
yr,t = yl,t + y

m , (25)
where yl,t is the quantity of tradable goods sold locally and y

m the quantity sold abroad.
2.1.6 Final Goods Producer
Finally, perfectly competitive firms produce a non-tradable final good yf,t by aggregating
domestic yl,t and foreign ym,t aggregate retail goods using a CES technology
yf,t =
[
()
1
γ (yl,t)
γ−1
γ + (1−) 1γ (ym,t)
γ−1
γ
] γ
γ−1
. (26)
The home bias parameter  denotes the fraction of the final good that is produced locally.
The elasticity of substitution between home-produced and imported goods is given by γ.
Final good producers maximize profits yf,t−pr,tyl,t−etpr,tym,t each period, where pr,t and pr,t
denote the real price of aggregate retail goods produced in Home and abroad, respectively,
and we have assumed the law of one price holds. Solving for the optimal demand functions
gives
yl,t =  (pr,t)
−γ yf,t, (27)
and
ym,t = (1−)
(
etp

r,t
)−γ
yf,t. (28)
We substitute out (27) and (28) into (26) to obtain
1 =  (pr,t)
1−γ + (1−) (etpr)1−γ , (29)
where pr,t = Pr,t/Pt and p

r = P

r /P
 are the retail prices in Home and abroad, respectively,
denominated in each country’s numeraire. Then we define implicitly the nominal consumer
price index as the value solving (29) for Pt.
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Government expenditure consists of unemployment benefits, consumption expenditure mod-
eled initially as a waste gw,t and lump-sum transfers, while revenues come from consumption,
capital income and labour income taxes.21 The primary deficit is, therefore, defined by
DFt = but + gw,t + Tt − τnt wthtnt − τ k(rkt − δt)xtkt − τ cct (30)
21We consider the role of productive and utility-enhancing public expenditure in Section 5.4.
yf,t = ct + it + gw,t + κυt + φ (zt)nt + ς (s˜t) stut. (34)
22Note that studying the possibility of sovereign default is beyond the scope of our paper.
and the government budget constraint is given by
rt−1bg,t−1 +DFt = bg,t . (31)
The government has initially two potential fiscal instruments, labour income tax rates τnt and
public expenditure gw,t. The other tax rates, τ
k and τ c, are treated as parameters. We will
consider each instrument separately, assuming that if one is active, the other remains fixed
at its steady state value. For Ψ ∈ {τn, gw}, following Erceg and Linde´ (2013) and Pappa
et al. (2015), we assume fiscal rules according to which the fiscal instruments depend on the
discrepancy between the debt-to-GDP ratio b˜g,t ≡ bg,tgdpt and an exogenous target bTg,t, and also
on the discrepancy between their changes, denoted by Δ. Specifically, we assume
Ψt = Ψ
(1−βΨ0) ΨβΨ0t−1
⎡
⎣
(
b˜g,t
bTg,t
)βΨ1 (
Δb˜g,t+1
ΔbTg,t+1
)βΨ2⎤⎦
(1−βΨ0)
, (32)
where βΨ1, βΨ2 > 0 for Ψ = τ
n, and βΨ1, βΨ2 < 0 for gw. The target debt-to-GDP ratio is
given by the AR(2) process
log bTg,t − log bTg,t−1 = ρ1(log bTg,t−1 − log bTg,t−2) + ρ2(logb¯− log bTg,t−1)− εbt , (33)
where b¯ is the steady-state level of the debt-to-GDP ratio and εbt is a white noise process
representing a fiscal consolidation shock. By introducing strong inertia through the AR(2)
process, we therefore consider a gradual (effectively permanent) reduction in the target for
the debt-to-GDP ratio (see also Erceg and Linde´ (2013), Pappa et al. (2015), Bandeira et al.
(2018)). As we explain below, for the fiscal rule (32), we calibrate the set of three parameters
for each fiscal instrument in such a way that the actual debt-to-GDP ratio meets the new,
lower target at the same time across the different instruments.22
2.1.8 Resource constraint
The non-tradable final good is sold for private and public consumption, ct and gw,t, and for
investment it. However, costs related to vacancy posting and looking for a job abroad reduce
the amount of resources available
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Aggregating the budget constraint of households using the market clearing conditions, the
budget constraint of the government, and aggregate profits, we obtain the law of motion for
net foreign assets, which corresponds to the current account and is given by
et (rf,t−1bf,t−1 − bf,t) = nxt + etΞt , (35)
where nxt are net exports defined as
nxt = pr,ty

m,t − etprym,t . (36)
The equation for exogenous exports is given by
ym,t =
(
pr,t
et
)γx
ym , (37)
where γx is the price elasticity of exports and ym is the steady-state level of exports pinned
down by the calibrated value of steady-state net foreign assets.
In turn, real GDP is defined as
gdpt = yf,t + nxt . (38)
Using (25) and (36), together with the equilibrium condition yf,t = pr,tyl,t + etp

rym,t, real
GDP can be equivalently expressed as
gdpt = pr,tyr,t . (39)
2.1.9 Lack of monetary policy independence
Regarding exchange rate policy, since the model is designed for peripheral countries of the
euro area, such as Greece, we solve it for a case without monetary policy independence.
Specifically, we assume that the nominal exchange rate E is exogenously set and, at the
same time, the domestic nominal interest rate on domestic government bonds Rt becomes an
endogenous variable (see, e.g., Erceg and Linde´ (2012)). The real exchange rate et is given
by
et =
E · P 
Pt
.
The nominal interest rate Rt is then pinned down endogenously through the Fisher equation
23
rt =
Rt
Etπt+1
. (40)
23As noted in Philippopoulos et al. (2017), in the case of flexible or managed floating exchange rates, E
and R switch positions, in the sense that the former becomes an endogenous variable Et, while the latter is
used as a policy instrument following a Taylor-type rule.
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where consumer price inflation πt is defined as
πt =
Pt
Pt−1
. (41)
Finally, we introduce a risk premium charged to Home households depending on the size of
the deviation from its steady-state value of the net foreign liabilities to real GDP ratio,
rf,t = r
exp
{
Γ
(
etbf,t+1
gdpt
− ebf
gdp
)
+ r,t
}
(42)
where Γ is the elasticity of the risk premium with respect to liabilities (see Schmitt-Grohe´
and Uribe (2003)), bf and e refer to the steady-state values of bf,t and et, and r,t is a risk
premium shock.
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3 Calibration strategy
We solve the model by linearizing the equilibrium conditions around a non-stochastic zero-
inflation steady state in which all prices are flexible, the price of the final good is normalized
to unity, and the real exchange rate is also equal to unity. We calibrate the model at an
annual frequency with Greece as our primary target economy (see also the simulation exercise
we perform in Section 5.5). Table 1 shows the key parameters and steady-state values we
target.
In the analysis that follows after this Section, we will compare the results of three versions
of the model: (i) without migration, (ii) with migration of the unemployed, and (iii) with
migration of both the unemployed and employed. To compare the dynamics across the
different specifications, we eliminate potential steady-state differences by working with the
full model specification (iii), setting all variables related to migration and on-the-job search
abroad to their steady-state values when considering the model specifications (i) and (ii).
National accounts
Using annual data from the Eurostat from 2008 to 2015, we set the shares of private con-
sumption, capital investment and imports in GDP equal to 62% , 18%, and 25%, respectively.
We also set net foreign assets and public debt to 10% and 127% of GDP, respectively, while
remittances over GDP in the steady state are fixed to 3%, in line with data from the World
Bank. The ratio of wasteful public spending to GDP is set equal to around 5%, using Gov-
ernment’s final consumption expenditure, taking out compensation of employees (which we
do not model) and consumption expenditure in the health and education sectors, which we
explore in Section 5.4 when looking at additional components of public spending.
Utility function
Following the literature, we set the discount factor β to 0.96, implying an annual interest
rate of 4%. Regarding the inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution η, much of the
literature cites the econometric estimates of Hansen and Singleton (1983), which place it
“between 0 and 2”. We fix it to unity, so that utility from consumption takes the logarithmic
form. External habits are set equal to 0.75, which is a common value in the literature. In
order to match the ratio of imports to GDP, we assume a degree of home bias equal to 0.75.
Following Erceg and Linde´ (2013), we set the elasticity between domestically produced and
imported goods equal to 1.2. To match the path of GDP in the simulations, we set the price
elasticity of exports γx to 0.2. The elasticity of hours worked is fixed to 1, while the relative
weight in utility χ is implicitly determined through the bargaining expression for hours (see
the Online Appendix) which we normalize in the steady state to unity. In Section 5.5, we
also explore a version of the model without the intensive margin.
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Production process
The capital share takes the standard value of 1/3 and the steady-state price markup over
marginal costs is set to 10%. The annual depreciation rate is calibrated to 8.8% in order to
match the ratio of capital investment to GDP above. The model’s steady state is independent
of the degree of price rigidities and the size of the investment adjustment costs. The latter
are included to moderate the response of investment with respect to fiscal shocks. We set
the degree of price stickiness λp equal to 0.25, which is a standard value on an annual basis,
and the degree of investment adjustment costs ω equal to 4.
Labour market
We start by normalizing total Home nationals n¯ to unity, of which 10% reside abroad.24 The
unemployment rate is set equal to 12%, which matches well the figure in Greece during 2009-
2010. For simplicity, we assume that the termination rates in the domestic and foreign labour
markets are both equal to 7%, which is the value used in Pappa et al. (2015). We set the
vacancy-filling and job-finding probabilities equal to 0.70 and 0.60 respectively, which pins
down the efficiency of the matching technology μ1. We calibrate the job-finding probability
abroad to be 60% higher than in Home, which allows us to match an unemployment rate
abroad of 7%, consistent with that of Germany in the same period. Using the laws of
motion of employment in Home and abroad, our calibration implies a steady-state share of
unemployed looking for a job abroad of 6.5%, whereas just below 0.5% of current workers
are matched to a job abroad. Our calibration also implies that, in the steady state, 34%
of migration outflows (household members who are newly matched with a job abroad) are
current workers in Home who obtained a job abroad through on-the-job search effort. This
number will be the starting point in our simulations for Greece for the period 2009-2015
in Section 5.5, where we will show that the model matches an average share of 48% over
the entire period, in line with the survey evidence in Labrianidis and Pratsinakis (2016)
mentioned in the Introduction. Vacancy-posting costs κ represent 15% of the wage, or, in
the aggregate, just under 1% of GDP. Finally, we enforce the Hosios condition by setting the
elasticity of matches to vacancies equal to the bargaining power of firms, μ2 = ϑ = 0.38 (see
below).
Search abroad and migration
For the cost of job search abroad for the unemployed and the employed, ς (s˜t) and φ (zt) re-
spectively, as well as the productivity of on-the-job search effort ϕ (zt) we adopt the following
functional forms:
24Data from the UN Population Division at the Department of Economic and Social Affairs shows that the
share of nationals living abroad in 2015 was above 8% for Greece, 19% for Ireland , 22% for Portugal, and
close to 5% for Spain and Italy. All numbers were higher compared to the previous data points for 2010.
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ς (s˜t) = ςs1 (s˜t)
ςs2 ,
φ (zt) = φz1 (zt)
φz2 ,
ϕ (zt) = ϕz1 (zt)
ϕz2 .
The scale parameters for search costs ςs1 and φz1, as well as the weight on the utility cost of
migration Ω, are implicitly determined by the first-order conditions (13) - (16) in the steady
state. While ensuring realistic positive values for these parameters, we choose the remaining
parameters by calibrating the net replacement rate b/ [(1− τn)w] = 0.41 in line with data
from the OECD Benefits and Wages Statistics, the bargaining power of firms ϑ = 0.38 in line
with Flinn (2006), and the wage premium abroad w/w = 1.10. These values imply that,
per job match abroad, search costs represent 46% and 36% of the wage for the unemployed
and the employed respectively. Put differently, total costs of job search abroad account for
around 0.33% of GDP. We then normalize search effort z to 1 and use the parameter for the
on-the-job search effort productivity ϕz1 to determine the steady-state number of workers
that are matched to a job abroad. The remaining parameters φz2, ςs2, ϕz2 together with the
elasticity of the utility cost of living abroad μ largely determine the magnitude of migration
outflows in response to shocks. We set φz2 and ςs2 such that the migration outflows in our
simulations for Greece in Section 5.5 match (i) the magnitude of migration outflows presented
in Lazaretou (2016) and (ii) the survey evidence in Labrianidis and Pratsinakis (2016) on
the share of emigrants that were previously employed in Greece (close to 50%). Specifically,
we calibrate ϕz2 jointly with φz2 so that the total number of workers emigrating in our
simulations matches the Greek data and, at the same time, on-the-job effort fluctuates to
reasonable values along the simulation horizon.25 Finally, the elasticity of the utility cost of
living abroad μ is normalized to 1. The higher the value of μ, the lower the magnitude of
the migration outflows. However, in the absence of costs to the number of workers abroad,
the ratio of pecuniary searching costs to GDP would have to be unrealistically high for the
model to reproduce the magnitude of outflows from Greece in our estimations.
Policy
The elasticity of the spread between domestic and foreign interest rates Γ is set equal to
0.001. We construct effective taxes following the methodology of Mendoza et al. (1994). We
calibrate the public-debt target rule (33) in such a way that the cut in the debt target bTg,t is
implemented gradually over 10 years, remaining below its steady state for an arbitrarily larger
number of time periods. For the fiscal rule (32), we calibrate the set of three parameters for
each fiscal instrument in such a way that the actual debt-to-GDP ratio b˜g,t meets the new,
25For instance, with ϕz2 = 1, zt could more than triple in our simulation just to generate the same number
of workers moving abroad. Krause and Lubik (2006) look at on-the-job search in the domestic market and
set ϕz1 = ϕz2 = 1, while letting the steady-state value of search effort z determine the number of low paid
workers moving to a better job. They calibrate the job-to-job transition rate to be 6%, whereas here the
comparative measure would be below 0.45%. This difference in magnitudes explains why we opt for ϕz2 > 1.
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lower target at the same time across the different instruments and at around 10 years after
the decision to consolidate is taken. Finally, we assume that all exogenous shock processes
follow an auto-regressive form with one lag and coefficient ρ = 0.75.
Table 1: Calibration
National accounts:
per capita real GDP gdp 1.00
private consumption / GDP C/gdp 0.62
private investment / GDP i/gdp 0.018
imports / GDP ym/gdp 0.25
public debt / GDP b¯ 1.27
net foreign assets / GDP bf/gdp 0.10
wasteful gov. spending / GDP gw/gdp 0.0533
remittances / GDP Ξ/gdp 0.03
Utility:
discount factor β 0.96
intertemporal elasticity η 1.01
external habits in consumption ζ 0.75
home bias in consumption  0.75
elasticity home/imported goods γ 1.20
elasticity exports γx 0.20
elasticity hours worked ξ 1.00
weight hours worked χ 1.68
Production:
capital share in production α 0.33
capital depreciation rate δ¯ 0.0088
investment adjustment costs ω 4.00
price monopolistic elasticity  11
price Calvo lottery λp 0.25
Labour market:
unemployment rate u/(u+ n) 0.12
stock of migrants me/n¯ 0.10
vacancy-filling probability ψF 0.70
job-finding probability ψH 0.60
job-finding probability abroad ψH/ψH 1.60
wage premium abroad w/w 1.10
firm’s bargaining power ϑ 0.38
vacancies matching elasticity μ2 ϑ
vacancy posting costs κv/w 0.15
net replacement rate b/ [(1− τn)w] 0.41
termination rates σ, σ 0.072
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Table 1: Calibration (continued)
Migration and search abroad:
on-the-job search effort z¯ 1.00
on-the-job search abroad cost φz1, φz2 0.0017, 3.40
on-the-job effort productivity ϕz1, ϕz2 0.0047, 3.00
unemployed’s search abroad cost ςs1, ςs2 0.6485, 0.15
disutility of migration Ω, μ 0.64, 1.00
Policy:
elasticity country premium Γ 0.001
labour income tax τn 0.30
capital income tax τk 0.20
consumption tax τc 0.10
debt target parameters ρ1, ρ2 0.6, 0.000001
fiscal rule parameters: τn βn0, βn1, βn2 0.75, -3.3, -6
fiscal rule parameters: gw βgw0, βgw1, βgw2 0.35, 5.5, 7
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4 Migration Over the Business Cycle
We begin our analysis by showing responses to standard business cycle shocks, namely a
negative productivity shock and a risk premium shock. The goal is to examine the behaviour
of migration variables and the impact of migration on economic aggregates in comparison to
a counterfactual scenario of labour force immobility.
4.1 TFP shock
Figure 3 reports the responses of the model for a negative TFP shock. Panel 3a shows the
migration and labour market variables, while panel 3b refers to the main aggregates in the
economy. The solid lines for the model without migration confirm that a negative TFP shock
leads to a decrease in vacancies and the real wage, given the drop in the marginal product
of labour. The job finding rate falls and pushes down on employment. As a result, the
unemployment rate rises. Due to sticky prices, markups decrease and so the drop in profits
becomes larger than the decrease in wages. Because the labour-increasing income effect of
lower profits dominates the labour-reducing effect of lower wages, hours rise. We also observe
a decrease in consumption, investment and GDP in the economy. Given the negative supply
shock, prices go up. On the other hand, the decrease in demand leads to a decrease in imports
and therefore a rise in net exports.
When we allow for cross-border job search of the unemployed, the dashed lines demon-
strate that the household increases the share of searchers for jobs abroad, which raises the
stock of migrants. The resulting decrease of labour supply in the domestic labour market
attenuates the decrease in the real wage and in the job-finding rate relative to the model
without migration. At the same time, the bigger reduction in the household’s income from
employment in Home intensifies the decrease in consumption and investment. Consequently,
firms post even fewer vacancies in the short run in order to decrease production capacity.
The reduction in labour supply and labour demand reinforce the decrease in employment.
For the unemployment rate we examine two measures: “Unempl. rate: all” refers to all
the Home residents who are unemployed, including those who look for jobs abroad while
receiving the domestic unemployment benefit. As we can see, migration mitigates the in-
crease of unemployment in the short run as it helps to reduce the total number of job seekers
through successful job matches abroad. However, this is reversed in the medium run as the
effect from the contraction in domestic employment dominates the reduction in job seekers
mentioned previously. Moreover, as the impact of the shock fades out and the job-finding
rate returns towards its steady-state level, we observe some return migration. The second
measure “Unempl. rate: H searchers” includes only the unemployed who look for domestic
jobs, therefore excluding those who seek a job in the foreign labour market. As expected,
this measure reveals a decrease of unemployment in the short run for those who aim to stay
in the country. In aggregate terms, consumption, investment and GDP fall by more than in
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the case without migration. However, a closer look at per capita measures shows that per
capita GDP actually falls by less, while the response of per capita investment hardly differs
between the two models. The higher fall in consumption in the model with migration relative
to the specification without migration is preserved in per capita terms, but is smaller in mag-
nitude, as expected. On the other hand, the positive response of net exports is significantly
reinforced in per capita terms. The latter outcome explains the fact that per capita GDP
falls by less with migration relative to the benchmark model of immobility.
The dash-dotted lines present the impulse response functions when we introduce in the
model on-the-job search abroad. After a negative TFP shock, workers increase substantially
the intensity with which they look for jobs abroad, which reinforces the increase in the
stock of migrants and the reduction employment relative to the previous two versions of the
model. At the same time, the search abroad of unemployed job seekers is mitigated, since
the exodus of workers due to successful matches abroad leads firms to cut vacancies by less,
attenuating the decrease in the domestic job finding rate. Consequently, the positive impact
of labour mobility on the short-run unemployment rate is mitigated. However, over time,
these unemployment gains from migration are reversed due to the stronger contraction in
employment. We also observe a decrease in the intensity of on-the-job search abroad below
its steady-state level. In aggregate terms, internal demand and GDP fall by more than in
the previous two versions of the model. Again, looking at per capita measures, we see that
actually per capita GDP falls by less than in the previous two versions of the model due to
the stronger increase in per capita net exports. The negative impact of labour mobility on
consumption is preserved but weakened in per capita terms.
In sum, a negative TFP shock increases the search abroad of unemployed job seekers for
many periods, which has a positive impact on short-run unemployment, but also reinforces
the negative effects of the shock on consumption and leads to higher unemployment costs over
time. Taking into account also the job search abroad of current workers reinforces the fall
in consumption, mitigates the short-run unemployment gains from migration and reinforces
unemployment costs over time.
4.2 Risk premium shock
Next, in Figure 4 we examine a risk premium shock, normalized to generate a 1% increase
in the nominal interest rate. This risk premium shock could come, from instance, from an
exogenous change in the country’s credit rating. Panel 4a shows the migration and labour
market variables, while panel 4b refers to the main aggregates in the economy. An increase in
the risk premium reduces domestic demand, pushing down on domestic prices and, therefore,
causing the real exchange rate to depreciate and net exports to increase. The fall in domestic
demand from the increase in the nominal interest rate leads firms to reduce vacancies and to
lower wages and markups. All other responses are in line with the results presented in Section
4.1 for a negative TFP shock. Specifically, an increase in the risk premium induces a higher
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fraction of unemployed searching for foreign jobs in the short run, which has a positive impact
on short-run unemployment, but also reinforces the negative effects on consumption. Taking
into account also the job search abroad of current workers reinforces the fall in consumption,
mitigates the short-run unemployment gains from migration and reinforces unemployment
costs over time.
Note that the main variables react similarly to the TFP and risk premium shocks, in-
cluding all the labour market variables and emigration in particular. This suggests that
the primitive cause of the recession does not seem to be crucial for these results. However,
the two shocks differ with respect to the response of inflation, which increases after a TFP
shock, while it decreases after a risk premium shock. For that reason, we prefer to base our
simulation exercise in section 5.5 on risk premium shocks.
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5 Migration and Fiscal Consolidation
In this section, we consider a shock that drives the debt-to-GDP target bTg,t, determined by
(33), 5% below its steady state. We simulate the responses to this shock with labour income
taxes or government spending adjusting through (32) so that the actual debt-to-GDP ratio
b˜g,t meets the new lower target after 10 quarters in the benchmark specification without
migration. In this way, we can ensure comparability for the tax-spending instruments, given
the same size and timing of fiscal consolidation in the baseline economy. When we introduce
subsequently migration decisions for the unemployed and the employed, we maintain the
same fiscal rule parameters βΨ0, βΨ1, βΨ2 (see Table 1).
5.1 Labour tax hikes
We begin with the case of tax-based consolidation, depicted in Figure 5 where panel 5a shows
the migration and labour market variables, while panel 5b refers to the main aggregates in
the economy. Starting with the model without migration (see solid lines), we can see that
consumption and investment fall, given the drop in after-tax income. The drop in demand
leads to a fall in vacancies, the job finding probability, and employment, while unemployment
rises. The labour tax hike also decreases hours by affecting negatively the incentives to work.
The fall in internal demand leads to a fall in the demand for imports, reflected in the increase
of net exports, but the contraction in internal demand is stronger and so real GDP falls.
When we introduce job search abroad for the unemployed (see dashed lines), the sig-
nificant fall in the job-finding probability induces the household to increase the share of
foreign-job seekers, leading to a higher stock of migrants. Vacancies and employment fall
substantially more, given the stronger contraction in demand. Due to the fact that more
unemployed job seekers are now directed abroad, both the conventional measure for unem-
ployment (“Unempl. rate: all”) and the measure for those searching domestically (“U rate:
H searchers”) fall in the short run, with the fall being more significant in the latter case, while
they subsequently rise, due to the more negative response of vacancies and employment in
the presence of migration. The unemployment gains from migration are therefore only tem-
porary. In aggregate terms, migration induces a stronger fall in consumption, investment
and GDP relative to the model without migration. The debt-to-GDP ratio therefore falls
more slowly, implying that it will take more time for the new debt target to be met, and the
increase in the labour income tax rate is higher than in the model without migration, hurting
the economy further. A look at per capita measures reveals that per capita consumption and
investment still fall by more than in the case without migration. This is explained by the
higher tax hikes required in the presence of migration, which gives rise to stronger distortions.
On the other hand, per capita GDP actually falls by less, in line with the fact that the rise
in net exports is significantly reinforced in per capita terms.
In the presence of on-the-job search abroad (see dash-dotted lines), a tax-based consoli-
dation significantly increases the intensity with which current workers look for employment
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abroad, raising further the stock of migrants, while mitigating the search abroad of the unem-
ployed. A higher stock of migrants abroad has a negative impact on internal demand, both in
aggregate and per capita terms. However, as before, for per capita GDP the fall is mitigated
from a reinforced increase in per capita net exports. Taking into account the migration of
the employed impacts negatively both measures of the unemployment rate, therefore limiting
the short-run unemployment gains from migration and increasing unemployment costs over
time due to a deeper demand contraction in the economy. On the fiscal side, the tax hike
and the time required to achieve fiscal consolidation is higher than in the other two versions
of the model.
In sum, labour tax hikes increase the search abroad of unemployed job seekers. On the
one hand, this has a positive impact on short-run unemployment, but, on the other hand,
it reinforces the negative effects on consumption and investment and leads to higher unem-
ployment costs over time. Taking into account also the job search abroad of current workers
reinforces the fall in consumption and investment, mitigates the short-run unemployment
gains from migration and reinforces unemployment costs over time. The migration of the
employed leads to a tax revenue leakage, since the migrants become tax payers abroad. Due
to this leakage, migration increases the required tax hike and time to achieve the same size
of fiscal consolidation. In other words, a higher tax hike hurts employment and demand,
leading to a second-order leakage from the tax revenue.
5.2 Public spending cuts
The case of cuts in wasteful government spending is displayed in Figure 6. The solid lines
for the baseline model without migration confirm the negative demand effect, which induces
vacancies, and consequently the job finding rate, to fall. This leads to a fall in employment
and an increase in unemployment. The real wage goes down, given the drop in labour demand,
but then increases slightly in the medium run, given the reduction in labour supply. The
latter comes from the well-known positive wealth effect for the household that reduces hours,
while it increases consumption and investment in expectation of lower taxes in the future.
Real GDP falls since the cut in government spending directly reduces aggregate demand in
the economy. The increase in net exports comes from a decrease in the demand for imports.
When job search abroad is allowed for the unemployed (see dashed lines), the negative
demand shock induces the household to initially increase the share of unemployed who look
for jobs abroad, which raises the stock of migrants. This mitigates the increase in consump-
tion, both in aggregate and per capita terms, and deteriorates the response of employment.
However, the share of foreign-job searchers falls in the medium run as the job-finding rate
and the real wage increase above the steady-state levels. Due to the fact that more unem-
ployed job seekers are directed abroad in the short run, both the conventional measure for
unemployment (“Unempl. rate: all”) and the measure for those searching domestically (“U
rate: H searchers”) are impacted positively in the short run, with the latter falling below
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its steady-state level, while the medium-run impact is negative, due to the more negative
response of employment in the presence of migration. As with labour tax hikes, the unem-
ployment gains from migration are therefore only temporary. The response of real GDP with
and without migration hardly differs, as its main driver is the reduction of aggregate demand
from the government spending cut itself rather than the mobility channel.
Cuts in public spending also have a non-monotonic impact on the intensity with which
current workers look for jobs abroad (see dash-dotted lines). The on-the-job search effort
increases (decreases) in the short run (medium run) following the fall (increase) in the real
wage. This is translated in a smaller increase in aggregate consumption and investment, as
well as a higher decline in labour, relative to the previous two specifications. Taking into
account the migration of the employed affects unemployment little relative to the model with
migration of the unemployed only.
In sum, a spending-based consolidation has a non-monotonic effect on the search abroad
of the unemployed. Migration leads to weaker positive effects on consumption and stronger
negative effects on employment. As with labour tax hikes, the unemployment gains from
migration are only temporary since unemployment costs become higher over time. Taking
into account cross-border on-the-job search in the model weakens the internal demand effects
of consolidation, in aggregate terms, while it affects unemployment little.
5.3 Comparison: tax-based versus spending-based consolidation
Figure 7 compares labour tax hikes and spending cuts in the full model (with cross-border
search of both the unemployed and the employed). A similar comparison in the other two
model specifications is provided in the Online Appendix. As can be seen in Figure 7a, tax
hikes lead to a bigger fall in vacancies, hours, the job-finding rate, the real after-tax wage,
and employment. Due to the stronger contraction in labour, a tax-based consolidation takes
longer to be achieved in the presence of migration, while the required time for a spending-
based consolidation is not altered. As can be seen in Figure 7b, due to adverse effects on
consumption and investment, labour tax hikes (dashed lines) lead to higher output and un-
employment costs than spending cuts (solid lines), except for the very short run when the
direct negative demand impact of spending cuts prevails, accompanied by higher unemploy-
ment costs. In per capita terms, however, the horizon over which spending cuts appear more
harmful to per capita GDP and the unemployment rate for those searching domestically (“U
rate: H searchers”) is significantly extended. Why tax hikes have a more favourable impact
on per capita GDP and unemployment for stayers for so many periods? The answer is that
by inducing stronger migration outflows than spending cuts, they reduce the resident pop-
ulation by significantly more and, as a result, the drop in per capita GDP becomes much
less pronounced. At the same time, the rise in per capita net exports after a tax-based
consolidation appears to be quite important.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 36 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1839
5.4 Expanding the role of government spending
We have considered so far cuts in wasteful government spending (see, e.g., Erceg and Linde´
(2013)). We now extend our analysis to also consider the role of utility-enhancing and
productive public expenditure, gc,t and gy,t respectively. To this end, we modify the utility
function as follows:
U (Ct, gc,t, ht, ne,t) =
Φ1−ηt
1− η − χ
(
h1+ξt nt + h
1+ξ
e ne,t
)
1 + ξ
− Ω(ne,t)
1+μ
1 + μ
, (43)
where Φt ≡
[
(1− α1)
(
Ct − ζC˜t−1
)α2
+ α1 (gc,t)
α2
] 1
α2 . The elasticity of substitution between
private and public consumption is given by 1−η
α2
. When this elasticity is greater than one,
private and public consumption are substitutes, while when it is below one, they are com-
plements (see also Bermperoglou et al. (2017)). The Cobb-Douglas specification is obtained
when the elasticity is equal to zero.
We also modify the production function to account for the role of productive public
expenditure as follows:
yt = At (ntht)
1−α (xtkt)
α (gy,t)
ν , (44)
where the parameter ν regulates how the public input affects private production: when ν is
zero, government spending is unproductive.
The composition of total government spending is therefore given by
gt = gw,t + gc,t + gy,t . (45)
As before, we consider each of the expanded set of instruments Ψ ∈ {τn, gw,gc, gy} sepa-
rately, assuming that if one is active, the other remains fixed at its steady state value. For
the steady-state output shares of the additional government spending components, we use
gc/GDP = 0.1048 and gy/GDP = 0.0512, based on annual Greek data from Eurostat.
26
For the fiscal rule parameters we use the following values: {βgc0, βgc1, βgc2} = {0.35, 3.35, 5}
and {βgy0, βgy1, βgy2} = {0.35, 9, 10}. Using the FOCs of the firm and of the household with
respect to gy,t and gc,t in the steady state, and simplifying further by using the FOC with
respect to ct, allows us to pin down the following parameter values
ν =
gy
y
= 0.05
26Specifically, for gy we use Government’s Gross Capital Formation and for gc we use Government’s
Expenditure in Health and Education, taking out the amount used in these sectors for Gross Capital Formation
to avoid double counting with the previous item.
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α1 =
(
1 + (1 + τ c)
(
C (1− ζ)
gc
)1−α2)−1
= 0.2925 .
Following the literature on Edgeworth complementarity between private and public consump-
tion goods (see, e.g., Bouakez and Rebei (2007), Fe`ve et al. (2013)), we set α2 = −0.75 < 0
so that private consumption and gc,t are complements.
27
Figure 8 compares the three spending instruments and labour tax hikes in the full model
(with job search abroad for both the unemployed and the employed).28 Regarding the mi-
gration and labour market variables shown in panel 8a, labour tax hikes lead to the highest
increase in the search for jobs abroad both for the employed and the unemployed, and there-
fore induce the biggest rise in the stock of migrants, as well as the biggest increase in the
medium-run unemployment (“U rate: all”), followed by cuts in productive, utility-enhancing
and wasteful spending. This is in line with the ranking of responses of vacancies, after-tax
wages and employment for the four instruments. The same conclusion is obtained if we look
at the time required for the new debt target to be met. Considering the unemployment rate
for those searching domestically (“U rate: H searchers”), we see that this ranking of instru-
27Note that the productive and utility-enhancing public goods are provided for free. However, to find their
optimal levels, we equate the marginal productivity of each of the public goods to its price, which is equal
to that of the private consumption good (our numeraire).
28In the Online Appendix we include the responses to a spending-based consolidation when public expendi-
ture is utility-enancing or productive for the three versions of the model: without migration, with migration
of the unemployed and with migration of both the unemployed and the employed. Extending the model
with a public sector would allow to also assess the role of the public wage bill cuts (see, e.g., Bandeira et al.
(2018)).
ments is reversed in the short run due to the decrease in unemployment from the exodus of
the labour force members. Turning to the main aggregates in panel 8b, in the medium run
labour tax hikes lead to the strongest fall in consumption, investment and output, whereas
over the short run cuts in the components of public spending that are either productive or
utility-enhancing lead to a much higher contraction in output than wasteful spending cuts
or labour tax hikes. In per capita terms, the latter result holds almost over the entire time
horizon. For per-capita consumption, the most detrimental fiscal consolidation instrument
seems to be cuts in utility-enhacing spending, given the complementarity with private con-
sumption, followed by labour tax hikes. For investment, both in per capita and aggregate
terms, the highest decrease is observed for tax hikes, followed by cuts in productive public
expenditure.
In sum, labour tax hikes induce the highest increase in migration outflows, leading in the
short run to the biggest decrease in unemployment for stayers, but in the medium run to the
biggest fall in aggregate GDP and increase in unemployment, followed by cuts in productive,
utility-enhancing and wasteful spending. However, in terms of per capita GDP, cuts in the
components of public spending that are either productive or utility-enhancing lead to a much
higher contraction than labour tax hikes or wasteful spending cuts.
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5.5 Fiscal consolidation mix in Greece
We have studied so far the interaction of migration and various fiscal consolidation instru-
ments separately, without considering a policy mix with both spending cuts and labour tax
hikes. In this subsection, we examine the predictions of our model when looking at the
actual tax-spending consolidation implemented in Greece, which stands out as an example
of public debt crisis and implementation of fiscal austerity policies. In 2010 Greece began
the implementation of such measures in order to receive conditional bailout packages from
international institutions.
We obtain annual data on the various components of public expenditure components from
Eurostat (see Section 5.4). All paths are inputted into the simulation as shares of 2009 GDP.
We allow lump-sum transfers to adjust to satisfy the government budget. As mentioned in
Section 3, our calibration targets the magnitude and composition of the recent migration
outflows in Greece. Specifically, we aim to to match (i) a total outflow of half a million until
2015 and (ii) a share of around 50% of emigrants that had a job before departure (Labrianidis
and Pratsinakis (2016)). Figure 9a shows the number of emigrants by previous employment
status, as generated by our simulations, and calculates the total amount of emigrants that left
Greece until 2015. According to the results displayed, our simulations do a fairly good job in
matching both (i) and (ii) above. Specifically, the model generates total migration outflows
of 536,000 persons. This number matches very accurately the figure obtained through the
Hellenic Statistic Authority (ELSTAT) for emigrants aged 15-64 during the period 2010-2015,
which is 533,188. The share of previously employed predicted by the model is 49%.
We start the economy at its steady state and then feed in the model the actual annual
values of the four fiscal consolidation instruments considered in the previous section for the
period 2009-2015 (see Figure 9b). Under the informational assumption of random walk, the
labour force expects the current fiscal policy stance to remain the same in the next period, so
any change is entirely unanticipated. Given the annual frequency adopted here and given also
that many ex post unanticipated changes in the fiscal packages were implemented in Greece
due to failure of previous plans and mid-course revisions, we believe the use of the random-
walk assumption is well justified. We proxy the macroeconomic environment in which the
fiscal consolidation package was implemented through a combination of a risk premium shock
and a negative investment shock. We include a table presenting information about the shocks
used in the simulation exercise as well as the results of the exercise without the investment
and risk premium shocks in the Online Appendix.
Results are reported in Figure 10. Panel 10a shows the simulation results for migra-
tion, unemployment, consumption, investment and GDP for all three versions of the model:
without migration (solid lines), with migration of the unemployed (dashed lines) and with
migration of both the unemployed and the employed (dash-dotted lines). As can be seen,
the increase in migration outflows in the full model (dash-dotted lines) is of the magnitude
observed in the data. The model also generates a significant increase in the intensity with
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which current workers look for employment abroad during the period 2010-2015. Consump-
tion, investment, and GDP decline following closely the actual path of the data, which is
depicted by the dotted lines for comparison. Regarding unemployment, the model also pre-
dicts a steady increase from 2010 onwards, even though its magnitude falls short of the data,
according to which between 2010 and 2015 the unemployment rate in Greece almost doubled
(from 13% to 25%). Yet, it is well known that in models with search and matching frictions
the volatility of unemployment is somehow limited. However, as panel 10b illustrates, if we
raise the firms’ bargaining power to a higher value (equal to 0.70), we do get a much larger
increase in unemployment (of around 70% higher than the steady-state level). This happens
because when the bargaining power of firms increases, the equilibrium wage level is closer to
the outside option of households, given that the firm is able to extract a bigger share of the
surplus of the match. When this is the case, the wage moves by less, given that the outside
option of households is mostly determined by the unemployment benefit, which is fixed. This
then makes firms decide to use the quantity margin (vacancies) by more since the wage is
now less sensitive to shocks. As a result, there will be more unemployed. At the same time,
wages moving by less means that on-the-job search effort for employment abroad increases
by less. Finally, looking at the measure of the unemployment rate only for those searching
domestically (“U rate: H searchers”) we see that the unemployment gains from emigration
for the stayers are limited when both the unemployed and employed can migrate. Note that
with a longer time horizon we would likely observe in the medium run higher unemployment
costs relative to the no-migration scenario, as discussed previously.
Finally, it is worth exploring in this exercise the role of the intensive versus the extensive
margin. Recall that we have chosen to leave the latter out of our modeling specification
so as not to blur the effects of migration on unemployment with the effects of labour force
participation. Moreover, Greece exhibits very low probabilities of changing labour market
status from inactivity to employment and vice versa (see Figure 5 in Garda (2016)). Panel
10c reports our simulations for the full model (with migration of both the unemployed and
the employed) for three specifications: the dashed lines now repeat the results shown in panel
10a for the model with hours, the solid lines show the results when we remove hours from the
model, and the dashed-dotted lines report the responses when we include endogenous labour
force participation, instead of hours, in the model.29 As can be seen, the main differences
appear in the response of the unemployment rate. When we remove hours from the model,
we tend to obtain a bigger increase in medium-run unemployment but a smaller increase
29We modify equation (43) as follows
U (Ct, gc,t, ht, ne,t) =
Φ1−η
1− η − χ
(
h1+ξt nt + h
1+ξ
e ne,t
)
1 + ξ
− Ω(ne,t)
1+μ
1 + μ
+X
l1−ϕlt
1− ϕl , (46)
where X > 0 is the relative preference for leisure, which is pinned down in steady state by the first-order
condition with respect to unemployment (see the Online Appendix), setting in steady state l = 1/3, and ϕl
is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply, which takes the standard value 4 in our calibration.
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in migration outflows, while with endogenous labour force participation, the increase in the
conventional measure of unemployment (“U rate: all”) occurs faster. At the same time, the
unemployment rate for those searching domestically (“U rate: H searchers”) increases, rather
than decreases, in the short run, driven by the increase in labour force participation following
the risk-premium and the negative investment-specific shocks.30
30In additional results included in the Online Appendix for simulations without the investment and risk
premium shocks, we show that in the model without hours both consumption and investment rise due to a
(i) stronger wealth effect after a spending-based consolidation and (ii) weaker migration and labour market
effects after a tax-based consolidation. In the model with extensive margin in the place of intensive margin,
the unemployment rate decreases due to the positive wealth effect of the fiscal consolidation mix that decreases
labour force participation.
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6 Conclusions
This paper has been motivated by the significant increase in migration outflows from the
periphery of Europe in search of employment, better pay and better social and economic
prospects in the aftermath of the Great Recession. We endogenized migration decisions of
the household both for its unemployed and employed members in a small open economy DSGE
model with search and matching frictions. The government implements fiscal consolidation
through labour income tax hikes or cuts in public spending. For the latter we consider various
possible roles, namely wasteful, utility-enhancing and productive.
We showed that migration can reinforce business-cycle fluctuations. A negative TFP
shock or a risk premium shock increases the search abroad of unemployed job seekers, which
has a positive impact on short-run unemployment, but also reinforces the negative effects
of the shock on consumption. Over time, as the impact of the shock fades out and the
job-finding rate returns towards its steady-state level, we observe some return migration,
which leads to higher unemployment costs in the medium run, relative to the no-migration
scenario. Taking into account also the job search abroad of current workers reinforces the fall
in consumption, mitigates the short-run unemployment gains from migration and reinforces
unemployment costs over time. The mitigation of the short-run unemployment gains is due to
the fact that the exodus of current workers with successful matches abroad leads firms to cut
vacancies by less, mitigating therefore the search abroad for unemployed job seekers, while
the reinforcement of the unemployment costs over time comes from the strongest contraction
in consumption and employment.
Regarding the interaction of migration with fiscal consolidation, our results indicated that
a tax-based consolidation induces the highest increase in emigration of both the unemployed
and employed, which implies an increase in the tax hike required to achieve a given size of
fiscal consolidation relative to the no-migration scenario and exacerbates the induced GDP
contraction. As a result, the unemployment gains from migration for the stayers are only
temporary. In the medium run, labour tax hikes lead to the biggest fall in aggregate GDP and
increase in unemployment. However, in terms of per capita GDP, cuts in the components
of public spending that are either productive or utility-enhancing lead to a much deeper
contraction than tax hikes or wasteful spending cuts. Government spending cuts have a non-
monotonic impact on migration: initially outflows are higher due to the negative demand
effect, while later this is reversed due to the wealth effect, which decreases hours and increases
the wage. Both in the case of tax hikes and spending cuts, the introduction of potential
migration by the employed limits further the short-run unemployment gains from migration
and reinforces the unemployment increase over time. Our simulations for the actual fiscal
consolidation mix implemented in Greece in a macroeconomic environment proxied by a
negative investment shock and a risk premium shock match well the size and composition of
migration outflows. Our analysis has therefore offered important policy recommendations on
the choice of fiscal consolidation instruments in the presence of migration and has stressed the
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need of measures to provide motives for employed workers not to flee the country especially
if a tax-based consolidation is implemented.
This paper has compared the effects of tax-spending instruments used for debt consolida-
tion in the presence of cross-country labour mobility. However, restrictions in new recruitment
of public employees have also been important in the fiscal adjustment of peripheral countries,
where the public sector is sizeable (e.g., Greece, Spain, Italy), and have led many graduates,
who were previously absorbed in public sector jobs, to emigrate. Further work in this area
could therefore look into the effects of public wage bill cuts in the presence of migration by
adding a public sector to this model (see, e.g., Bandeira et al. (2018), Bradley et al. (2017),
and Bermperoglou et al. (2017)). Second, this paper has used a small open economy model,
treating the foreign economy as exogenous. Future work could consider a two-country model,
allowing to study the effect of global shocks affecting the foreign country too, as well as the
effects of immigration on the host economy in line with recent empirical work (see, e.g.,
Furlanetto and Robstad (2017)). Third, our results about the unemployment costs in the
presence of migration and fiscal consolidation may well be considered as the lowest bound,
since there is important evidence that a significant proportion of the recent emigrants were
young and highly skilled. Another interesting extension could therefore be to incorporate on-
the-job search and heterogeneous workers in terms of skills (see, e.g., Dolado et al. (2009)) in
a model with migration. The long-run costs from the emigration of the employed would be
also amplified if we considered (post-match) training costs. Finally, even though the paper is
motivated by the migration outflows of Europe’s periphery during the Great Recession, our
model is general enough to study other cases too. For instance, according to recent figures
from the U.K. Office for National Statistics, the highest level of EU emigration from Britain
since the 2008 recession was recorded in 2017, following the Brexit referendum in 2016. Our
model can also speak to episodes such as when eastern European countries joined the EU
and saw a surge in migration outflows to other EU countries. We leave these topics for future
research.
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Figures
Figure 1: Net migration flows, defined as outflows minus inflows (in thousand persons), from
Europe’s periphery, Source: Eurostat
Figure 2: Emigration phases in Greek history (all age groups)
Source: updated graph from Lazaretou (2016)
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Figure 3: A 1% negative shock to TFP
(a) Migration and Labour Market
(b) Aggregates
Responses for interest rates and inflation are shown in annualized levels. Responses for the job-
finding rate and net exports are in levels. All other responses are in percent deviations from steady
state. Consumption refers to consumption of the domestic good. OTJ denotes on the job and p.c.
denotes per capita. Unempl. rate: all and Unempl. rate: H searchers denote measures of the
unemployment rate including and excluding, respectively, the share of unemployed that look for a
job abroad.
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Figure 4: A risk premium shock inducing a 1% increase in the nominal interest rate
(a) Migration and Labour Market
(b) Aggregates
Responses for interest rates and inflation are shown in annualized levels. Responses for the job-
finding rate and net exports are in levels. All other responses are in percent deviations from steady
state. Consumption refers to consumption of the domestic good. OTJ denotes on the job and p.c.
denotes per capita. Unempl. rate: all and Unempl. rate: H searchers denote measures of the
unemployment rate including and excluding, respectively, the share of unemployed that look for a
job abroad.
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Figure 5: Tax-based consolidation
(a) Migration and Labour Market
(b) Aggregates
Responses for the job-finding rate and net exports are in levels. All other responses are in percent
deviations from steady state. Consumption refers to consumption of the domestic good. OTJ de-
notes on the job and p.c. denotes per capita. Unempl. rate: all and Unempl. rate: H searchers
denote measures of the unemployment rate including and excluding, respectively, the share of un-
employed that look for a job abroad. The black line in the Debt/GDP panel reports the path for
the debt-to-GDP target.
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Figure 6: Spending-based consolidation
(a) Migration and Labour Market
(b) Aggregates
Responses for the job-finding rate and net exports are in levels. All other responses are in percent
deviations from steady state. Consumption refers to consumption of the domestic good. OTJ de-
notes on the job and p.c. denotes per capita. Unempl. rate: all and Unempl. rate: H searchers
denote measures of the unemployment rate including and excluding, respectively, the share of un-
employed that look for a job abroad. The black line in the Debt/GDP panel reports the path for
the debt-to-GDP target.
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Figure 7: Comparison of instruments with labour force mobility
(a) Migration and Labour Market
(b) Aggregates
Responses for the job-finding rate and net exports are in levels. All other responses are in percent
deviations from steady state. Consumption refers to consumption of the domestic good. OTJ de-
notes on the job and p.c. denotes per capita. Unempl. rate: all and Unempl. rate: H searchers
denote measures of the unemployment rate including and excluding, respectively, the share of un-
employed that look for a job abroad. The black line in the Debt/GDP panel reports the path for
the debt-to-GDP target.
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Figure 8: Comparison of additional instruments with labour force mobility
(a) Migration and Labour Market
(b) Aggregates
Responses for the job-finding rate and net exports are in levels. All other responses are in percent
deviations from steady state. Consumption refers to consumption of the domestic good. OTJ de-
notes on the job and p.c. denotes per capita. Unempl. rate: all and Unempl. rate: H searchers
denote measures of the unemployment rate including and excluding, respectively, the share of un-
employed that look for a job abroad. The black line in the Debt/GDP panel reports the path for
the debt-to-GDP target. Regarding the role of government spending, (w), (u), (p) denote wasteful,
utility-enhancing, productive, respectively.
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Figure 9: Simulation exercise
(a) Composition and size of migration outflows
(b) Paths of tax-spending instruments
For the fiscal instruments we show growth rates in percentages relative to 2009. G denotes govern-
ment spending.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA PUBLICATIONS 
WORKING PAPERS  
1801  OLYMPIA BOVER, LAURA HOSPIDO and ERNESTO VILLANUEVA: The impact of high school financial education on 
financial knowledge and choices: evidence from a randomized trial in Spain.
1802  IGNACIO HERNANDO, IRENE PABLOS, DANIEL SANTABÁRBARA and JAVIER VALLÉS: Private Saving. New Cross-
Country Evidence Based on Bayesian Techniques.
1803  PABLO AGUILAR and JESÚS VÁZQUEZ: Term structure and real-time learning.
1804  MORITZ A. ROTH: International co-movements in recessions.
1805  ANGELA ABBATE and DOMINIK THALER: Monetary policy and the asset risk-taking channel.
1806  PABLO MARTÍN-ACEÑA: Money in Spain. New historical statistics. 1830-1998.
1807  GUILHERME BANDEIRA: Fiscal transfers in a monetary union with sovereign risk.
1808  MIGUEL GARCÍA-POSADA GÓMEZ: Credit constraints, fi rm investment and growth: evidence from survey data.
1809  LAURA ALFARO, MANUEL GARCÍA-SANTANA and ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO: On the direct and indirect real 
effects of credit supply shocks.
1810  ROBERTO RAMOS and CARLOS SANZ: Backing the incumbent in diffi cult times: the electoral impact of wildfi res.
1811  GABRIEL JIMÉNEZ, ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO and RAQUEL VEGAS: Bank lending standards over the cycle: 
the role of fi rms’ productivity and credit risk.
1812  JUAN S. MORA-SANGUINETTI and ROK SPRUK: Industry vs services: do enforcement institutions matter for 
specialization patterns? Disaggregated evidence from Spain.
1813  JAMES CLOYNE, CLODOMIRO FERREIRA and PAOLO SURICO: Monetary policy when households have debt: new 
evidence on the transmission mechanism.
1814  DMITRI KIRPICHEV and ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO: The costs of trade protectionism: evidence from Spanish fi rms 
and non-tariff measures.
1815  ISABEL ARGIMÓN, CLEMENS BONNER, RICARDO CORREA, PATTY DUIJM, JON FROST, JAKOB DE HAAN, 
LEO DE HAAN and VIKTORS STEBUNOVS: Financial institutions’ business models and the global transmission of 
monetary policy.
1816  JOSE ASTURIAS, MANUEL GARCÍA-SANTANA and ROBERTO RAMOS: Competition and the welfare gains from 
transportation infrastructure: evidence from the Golden Quadrilateral of India.
1817  SANDRA GARCÍA-URIBE: Multidimensional media slant: complementarities in news reporting by US newspapers .
1818  PILAR CUADRADO, AITOR LACUESTA, MARÍA DE LOS LLANOS MATEA and F. JAVIER PALENCIA-GONZÁLEZ: 
Price strategies of independent and branded dealers in retail gas market. The case of a contract reform in Spain.
1819  ALBERTO FUERTES, RICARDO GIMENO and JOSÉ MANUEL MARQUÉS: Extraction of infl ation expectations from 
fi nancial instruments in Latin America.
1820  MARIO ALLOZA, PABLO BURRIEL and JAVIER J. PÉREZ: Fiscal policies in the euro area: revisiting the size of spillovers.
1821  MARTA MARTÍNEZ-MATUTE and ALBERTO URTASUN: Uncertainty, fi rm heterogeneity and labour adjustments. 
Evidence from European countries.
1822  GABRIELE FIORENTINI, ALESSANDRO GALESI, GABRIEL PÉREZ-QUIRÓS and ENRIQUE SENTANA: The rise and fall 
of the natural interest rate.
1823  ALBERTO MARTÍN, ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO and TOM SCHMITZ: The fi nancial transmission of housing bubbles: 
evidence from Spain.
1824  DOMINIK THALER: Sovereign default, domestic banks and exclusion from international capital markets.
1825  JORGE E. GALÁN and JAVIER MENCÍA: Empirical assessment of alternative structural methods for identifying cyclical 
systemic risk in Europe.
1826  ROBERTO BLANCO and NOELIA JIMÉNEZ: Credit allocation along the business cycle: evidence from the latest boom 
bust credit cycle in Spain.
1827  ISABEL ARGIMÓN: The relevance of currency-denomination for the cross-border effects of monetary policy.
1828 SANDRA GARCÍA-URIBE: The effects of tax changes on economic activity: a narrative approach to frequent anticipations.
1829 MATÍAS CABRERA, GERALD P. DWYER and MARÍA J. NIETO: The G-20 regulatory agenda and bank risk.
1830 JACOPO TIMINI and MARINA CONESA: Chinese exports and non-tariff measures: testing for heterogeneous effects at the
 product level.
1831  JAVIER ANDRÉS, JOSÉ E. BOSCÁ, JAVIER FERRI and CRISTINA FUENTES-ALBERO: Households’ balance sheets and
the effect of fi scal policy.
1832  ÓSCAR ARCE, MIGUEL GARCÍA-POSADA, SERGIO MAYORDOMO and STEVEN ONGENA: Adapting lending policies 
when negative interest rates hit banks’ profi ts.
1833  VICENTE SALAS, LUCIO SAN JUAN and JAVIER VALLÉS: Corporate cost and profi t shares in the euro area and the US: 
the same story?
1834  MARTÍN GONZÁLEZ-EIRAS and CARLOS SANZ: Women’s representation in politics: voter bias, party bias, and electoral 
systems.
1835  MÓNICA CORREA-LÓPEZ and BEATRIZ DE BLAS: Faraway, so close! Technology diffusion and fi rm heterogeneity in the 
medium term cycle of advanced economies.
1836  JACOPO TIMINI: The margins of trade: market entry and sector spillovers, the case of Italy (1862-1913).
1837  HENRIQUE S. BASSO and OMAR RACHEDI: The young, the old, and the government: demographics and fi scal 
multipliers.
1838  PAU ROLDÁN and SONIA GILBUKH: Firm dynamics and pricing under customer capital accumulation.
1839  GUILHERME BANDEIRA, JORDI CABALLÉ and EUGENIA VELLA: Should I stay or should I go? Austerity, 
unemployment and migration.
Unidad de Servicios Auxiliares
Alcalá, 48 - 28014 Madrid
E-mail: publicaciones@bde.es
www.bde.es
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 55 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1839
Figure 10: Fiscal consolidation mix in Greece during the Great Recession: simulation results
(a) Baseline calibration
(b) Higher bargaining power of firms
(c) Intensive and extensive margins (full model)
Responses for migration outflows are in levels (thousands persons). All other responses are in
percent deviations from steady state. Consumption refers to consumption of the domestic good.
OTJ denotes on the job. Unempl. rate: all and Unempl. rate: H searchers denote measures of the
unemployment rate including and excluding, respectively, the share of unemployed that look for a
job abroad. 50
